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by Stephen J. Toope 
F.R. Scott was a poet, an advocate and a scholar who cared passionately about human rights in Canada and 
around the world. Building from Scott's poem ' O n  Kanbawza Road," the author extrapolates a vision of what 
Western actors must  do to  achieve a true dialogue on human rights that respects cultural diversity. 
The shift i n  focus from the setting of recognized standards to  the implementation of those norms has increased 
tensions i n  the area of international human rights. The attempts to  define, categorize and group human rights 
have been less successful at achieving consensus than they have been at unearthing the Western philosophy of 
the core of the exercise. Revealing these Western sources has only exacerbated the existing clash-of-cultures 
debate. The author questions what i s  meant by culture within that debate. He argues that culture operates on  
the levels of form, structure and myth, but emphasizes the need to  recognize the mythic level of human rights 
in  the Western tradition. Two dificulties then arise. Is a society's culture defined solely at the stmctural 
level by the legally legitimate state, or do other entities matter as well? However it may be defined, i s  that 
culture then susceptible to  change, or do its values ensure some form of purity? The author argues that the 
answers to  both inquiries are not reached in as static a manner as clash-of-cultures proponents would seem 
to believe. 
Using his interpretation of "On Kanbawza Road" as a guide, the author indicates that human-rights discus- 
sions must move beyond arguments over which philosophy underpins whose terminology. Common values 
within contrary terms and tenets must  be recognized. All voices within a cultural group deserve to  be heard. 
The Western listeners must  be humble, approaching the encounter with neither an accusatoy nor conde- 
scending predisposition. 
F.R. Scott e'tait u n  podte, u n  avocat et u n  professeur qua await d coeur la protection des droits de la personne, 
tant au Canada que dans le reste du monde. A partir du podme "On Kanbawza Road," de F.R. Scott, l'auteur 
propose u n  discours sur les droits de la personne qui respecte la diversite' culturelle. 
Le passage d'une &re de creation de normes d une ire de mise en  place de ces normes a accru la tension 
dans le domaine des droits de la personne. Plut6t que de cre'er u n  consensus, les diverses tentatives visant 
d de'finir, d cate'goriser et d grouper les droits de la personne ont eu pour re'sultat de r6ve'ler l'eurocentrisme 
des valeurs ve'hicule'es. La prise de conscience des racines occidentales des droits de la personne n'a fait 
qu'exacerber le de'bat entourant le choc des cultures. 
L'auteur remet en  question la dkfinition de "culture" telle qu'employe'e dans ce de'bat. ll af irme que la culture 
opdre au niveau de la forme, de la structure et du mythe, et il souligne l'importance du contenu mythique 
dans le discours sur les droits de la personne d l'inte'rieur de la tradition occidentale. Deux probldmes se 
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posent alors. T o u t  d'abord, la culture droit-elle se de'finir un iquement  a u  niveau structure1 de l 'ktat 
le 'gitimement constitue', o u  doi t -on t en i r  compte  d'autres entite's ci l ' i n t i r i eur  de l ' ~ t a t ?  P a r  ailleurs, 
la culture est-elle susceptible de changer et d'e'voluer, o u  doit  elle plut6t t t r e  perCue c o m m e  la rialisation 
concrkte  de valeurs  pures? La  rkponse ci ces deux  questions n e  saurait  Ztre aussi statique que le laissent 
entendre les t enan t s  du  choc des  cultures.  
A partir de s o n  interpre'tation du  p o i m e  " O n  Kanbawza Road," l 'auteur  conclz~t  qu'il est  t e m p s  d'abandonner 
le de'bat s u r  les valeurs  philosophiques ve'hicule'es par la terminologie des droits de la personne. I1 importe 
plut6t de rechercher les valeurs  c o m m u n e s  qui sont  vkhicult?es par des terminologies et des doctrines contra- 
dictoires.  Tou tes  les vo ix  me'ritent d ' t t re  en tendues .  L 'auditozre occidental se doit  d'e'couter avec humilitk, 
sans  accusat ion et sans  condescendance. 
Introduction 
A s  he was considering whether or not to  take 
up the Deanship of McGill's Faculty of Law, 
F.R. Scott is apocryphally reported to have deliv- 
ered an Eleventh Commandment: "Thou shalt not 
commit deanery." I know exactly what he meant. 
F.R. Scott was a poet, an advocate and a scholar. 
He would never have wanted to see himself defined 
as an administrator. 
The invitation to deliver this lecture has proven to 
be a gift of great value to me, for it has helped me 
to escape - if only briefly - from the confines of aca- 
demic administration. I have had occasion to  re-read 
the collected verse of Frank Scott, and can only reaf- 
firm J. King Gordon's evaluation "an emancipated 
spirit found expression in his poetry, in his fine sense 
of humour and in his enthusiasm."' I have also been 
forced to reflect upon my theme - cultural diversity 
and human rights - in the shadow of Scott's keen 
intellect. Finally, I have been called upon to  visit 
and use a McGill library. Although I seem to spend 
much of my time soliciting donations for the library 
system, all too few occasions arise for me to  explore 
its rich resources. 
I have felt the personal imprint of F.R. Scott's 
legacy over the last few weeks. The poet, the ad- 
vocate and the scholar - I have been privileged to 
engage with all three facets of Scott as I prepared 
this lecture. I also sense another connection, made 
palpable by my own Trinitarian definition of Scott's 
career. Although it is secularized in his poetry, I de- 
tect En Scott an imprint of the Anglican rectory: re- 
call the famous "Creed" which includes the declara- 
tion that "The spirit of man is my God / The future 
of man is my h e a ~ e n . " ~  One of the many strains of 
Anglicanism emphasizes social justice and religious 
pluralism. Again in the words of J .  King Gordon: 
.'Scott had grown up in a home where the Christian 
imperative was expressed through a faith in tlhe as- 
pirations of men and ~ o m e n . " ~  I share that irnpnnt, 
and it draws me emotionally to Scott; those aspira- 
tions - for respect, for dignity - are the subject of 
my discussion. 
F.R. Scott cared passionately about human rights. 
Aside from his famous engagements as a barrister be- 
fore the courts of Quebec and the Supreme Court of 
Canada, when he "went to bat for the Lady Chatten4 
and took on Maurice D u p l e s ~ i s , ~  Scott was also an 
unrepentant proselytizer. In 1959 he gave a series of 
four lectures on C.B.C. Radio entitled T h e  Canadian 
Cons t i tu t ion  and H u m a n  Rights.  In these lectures 
he assessed the historical legacy of human rights in 
Canada, and proposed the creation of a charter of 
rights entrenched in the written constitution. Even 
in his poetry, Scott often adopted the tone of the op- 
timistic advocate, albeit in the lyrical voice. I quote 
from "Spain 1937 , "~  
In the spring of ideas they were, the rare 
spring 
That breaks historic winters. Street and 
field 
Stirring with hope and green with new en- 
deavour, 
The cracking husks copious with sprouting 
seed. 
Here was destruction before flowering. 
Here freedom was cut in its first tendrils. 
The issue is not ended with defeat. 
Scott was also committed to the celebration of cul- 
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tural diversity. I quote in its brief entirety "Bonne 
Entente" :7 
The advantages of living with two cultures 
Strike one a t  every turn, 
Especially when one finds a notice in an 
office building: 
"This elevator will not run on Ascension 
Day" ; 
Or reads in the Montreal Star: 
"Tomorrow being the Feast of the Immac- 
ulate Conception, 
There will be no collection of garbage in 
the city"; 
Or sees on the restaurant menu the bilin- 
gual dish: 
DEEP APPLE PIE 
TARTES AUX POMMES PROFONDES 
Mais ces rkflections ne sont pas des rkvklations. 
Nous connaissons bien Scott le dkfenseur des droits 
de la personne et  Scott l'observateur ironique des 
deux solitudes canadiennes (une idge qu'il n'a 
d'ailleurs jamais acceptde). Ce qui m'a le plus frappk 
en relisant son oeuvre, c'est un thkme qui rejoint mes 
propres pr&occupations, & savoir les droits de la per- 
sonne et la diversitk culturelle dans une perspective 
globale. Nous considkrons souvent Scott comme le 
symbole du patriotisme canadien, cependant son at- 
tachement B une certaine idke du Canada ktait fond6 
sur son dkvouement profond pour l'amklioration de 
la condition humaine. 
Permit me to  quote a t  length what has become 
my favourite Scott poem - "On Kanbawza R ~ a d " : ~  
In Southeast Asia 
the Buddhist New Year 
starts with a water festival 
lasting for days 
Everything is put aside 
for this glorification 
of rebirth 
Even the guerrillas 
who regularly cut the water-main 
into Rangoon 
promised no damage to the pipe-line 
during these celebrations 
Only astrologers can tell 
the exact moment 
when the god descends 
and the year is born 
A gun booms out their message 
And walking by the Kanbawza Hotel 
on that bright morning 
under a torrid sun 
I approached a gate on the roadway 
where stood a girl-child 
not three feet high 
holding a bowl of water 
with a spray 
of the sacred tha-bye tree 
She too was celebrating 
she was waiting to sprinkle 
each passerby 
with the symbolic drops 
But I I was a white man 
standing so far above her 
not easy to anoint 
She moved toward me 
then drew back 
afraid 
She understood the ritual 
taught in her family 
but never dreamed a foreign giant 
might need her blessing 
Seeing her torn 
between faith and fear 
I sat down on my heels 
Burmese fashion 
levelling my eyes with her eyes 
At once her fear vanished 
she smiled a t  me 
her little hands 
dipped the sprig in the bowl 
and touched me with the fertility 
of love 
In our torn century, despairing of faith and filled 
with fear, how can we find ways to touch each other 
"with the fertility of love"? I believe that true dia- 
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logue across cultures on the fundamental questions 
of respect for persons and human dignity can pro- 
vide us all with such moments of transcendence as 
experienced by F.R. Scott on Kanbawza Road. 
Scott himself has provided three clues as to how 
such transcendence can occur. First, we must place 
ourselves in direct contact with other cultural tra- 
ditions. Contact does not presuppose comprehen- 
sion; but a willingness to enter into situations where 
diverse perspectives and attitudes are voiced is a 
precondition to  any ultimate shared understanding. 
Secondly, we must be willing to ask for the bless- 
ings of others, especially those less powerful than 
ourselves. In his encounter with the little girl on 
Kanbawza Road, Scott recognized both his physi- 
cal power as a "giant" and his social power as a 
"foreign giant". But he also knew that he needed 
the girl's blessing, which would be a surprise to  her. 
Thirdly, Scott tells us to  sit down on our heels and 
level our eyes with people from other cultural tradi- 
tions. Only then is any real communication possible. 
Ces intuitions sont d'une importance capitale Q 
notre kpoque. En effet, malgrk la grande tradi- 
tion du discours sur les droits de la personne issu 
des cendres de la deuxikme guerre mondiale, nous 
sommes menaces aujourd'hui par un contrecourant. 
Des clameurs insistantes s'klkvent contre les normes 
internationales des droits de la personne, B l'effet 
qu'il ne s'agit que d'un nouveau cheval de Troie qui 
permettrait Q I'imp6rialisme occidental de refleurir. 
Loin de promouvoir la solidaritk, ces normes camou- 
fleraient une idkologie sectaire. 
The International Human-Rights Sys- 
tem 
I would like to  offer a personal, perhaps idiosyn- 
cratic, reading of the contemporary international 
human-rights debate. I sense that a significant 
underlying reason for the emergence of a clash-of- 
cultures rhetoric in international human-rights dis- 
cussion is the movement from so-called "standard 
setting" (the period from 1948 to the mid-1980s 
when governments tried to reach agreement upon 
explicit standards to  which they would be will- 
ing to  be bound) towards an implementation of 
norms. The new focus upon implementation of 
"universal" norms, as pursued by international non- 
governmental organizations and a number of West- 
ern governments since the mid-1980s, has heightened 
interregional tensions associated with human rights. 
This was inevitable: once one begins to stress imple- 
mentation rather than articulation of norms, states 
- no matter what their cultural or ideological roots 
- will feel threatened. This is particularly true in 
the area of human rights, where the mechanisms for 
implementation remain largely political rather than 
legal. In turn, when rights are invoked in politi- 
cal discourse and given real bite, not only will im- 
plementation processes be challenged, but greater 
scrutiny will be applied to the substantive content 
of the rights being called into play. 
I want to emphasize the weak role of international 
legal mechanisms in the implementation of human- 
rights  standard^.^ The International Court, of Jus- 
tice ("I.C.J.") has been almost wholly inactive in the 
area of human rights, as have most other adjudica- 
tive bodies, with the notable exceptions of the Euro- 
pean Court of Human Rights and, to a lesser extent, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.'' The 
new tribunal empowered to hear cases involving war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia has been hamstrung by an in- 
ability to  pursue accused perpetrators and by a lack 
of political will on the part of states which trum- 
peted its creation. The various committees which 
sit under a diverse group of international covenants, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Po- 
litical Rights,'' the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights,12 and the Con- 
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim- 
ination against Women,13 are limited in power and 
in their permitted scope of inquiry. With the ex- 
ception of the Human Rights Committee when sit- 
ting under the terms of the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,14 all of the committees are restricted to re- 
ceiving and commenting upon state reports relating 
to the national implementation of the relevant con- 
vention. The reports of some states are cursory at 
best, willfully misleading a t  worst. Even the Human 
Rights Committee, which has jurisdiction under the 
Optional Protocol to hear individual complaints, can 
only "forward its views," at the end of any particular 
case, to the state involved.15 There is no mechanism 
for implementation of a committee decision, aside 
from the court of public opinion. 
Therefore, implementation of human-rights norms 
by states is largely dependent upon overtly politi- 
cal action in bilateral diplomacy, or in multilateral 
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fora such as the Human Rights Commission of the 
United Nations. Recently, the establishment of the 
office of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has provided another focus of attention for human 
right,s within the U.N. system. However, the high 
commissioner's power is highly circumscribed, and 
the first incumbent has taken a cautious approach 
to his job.16 
Le mise en application multilatkrale de ces normes 
est instaurke de f a ~ o n  rCgionale par l'intermkdiaire 
d'organismes tels que le Commonwealth, la Fran- 
cophonie et l'organisation pour l'unitk africaine. 
La mise en application dans ces fora sera presque 
entibrement politique: les   tats seront soumis B un 
examen international et kventuellement condamnks. 
Dans certains cas extrbmes, des sanctions pourraient 
6tre imposbes. 
By far the most common form of implementa- 
tion of human-rights standards by states remains 
traditional bilateral diplomacy. This can extend 
from oral condemnations through ambassadorial 
de'marches to formal contacts with opposition and 
human-rights organizations. In extreme cases, link- 
ages may be made with state policies relating to aid 
and trade. Such linkages, however, appear to have 
been lessening, rather than increasing, over the last 
few years. The current Canadian government has in 
most cases explicitly rejected the linkage of human 
rights with aid and trade initiatives.17 
Diplomatic activity in support of human rights 
engages cultural diversity in both positive and neg- 
ative ways. To the extent that diplomacy opens up 
multilateral or bilateral negotiations, cultural fac- 
tors can be raised, assessed and debated. However, 
diplomacy is inevitably charged with the burden of 
broader interstate relations which can result in the 
mixing of agendas. In addition, negotiations are 
very much influenced by imbalances of power. More- 
over, as quintessential interstate activities, negotia- 
tions will be affected by issues of regime legitimacy. 
Negotiators may reach accommodations which are 
not supported by the citizenry, or negotiations may 
fail when negotiators lack respect for the "opposing" 
regime. 
This brief outline of the international human- 
rights system is intended merely to reiterate my 
central point that international human-rights law is 
weakly articulated in terms of implementation mech- 
anisms. For that reason, political implementation 
is required and this inevitably sets up significant 
tensions between states. These tensions are inher- 
ent in the post-World War I1 structure of interna- 
tional relations. The Charter of the United Nations 
makes a number of references to the promotion of 
human rights as a goal of the organization and its 
members.18 Yet simultaneously, article 2(7) of the 
Charter emphasizes the traditional principle of non- 
intervention in the internal affairs of states. The 
promotion of human rights inevitably results in in- 
tervention, broadly conceived, thereby creating po- 
litical tensions based upon traditional understand- 
ings of sovereignty. When implementation becomes 
the focus of international human-rights debates, ten- 
sions rise and resistance appears on the part of many 
states.lg 
Definitional Issues 
A. Human Rights 
The first question I want to pose is fundamental: 
what do we mean by "human rights"? In anthro- 
pological or sociological terms, human rights is re- 
ally nothing more than a "symbol" of respect for 
persons.20 As such, it is a cultural artifact with 
both positive and negative aspects. The positive 
aspects are obvious: human rights is a collective 
statement that individuals and social groups matter 
and that they cannot simply be treated as means 
to overriding ends. More negatively, one might ar- 
gue that invoking rights implies that we are less in- 
terested in the welfare of a person from a caring 
perspective.21 There may indeed be some lost social 
and moral value when an explicit declaration of re- 
spect is needed to replace innate patterns of social 
behaviour rooted in a culture that promotes respect 
for others. 
But these observations are not particularly sat- 
isfying from a lawyer's perspective. That is why 
F.R. Scott was so committed to an explicit and 
constitutionally entrenched charter or bill of rights 
within Canada. Lawyers constantly strive - rightly 
and wrongly - for more precise and more "legal" 
definitions of human rights. Rather than being mere 
descriptors of social behaviour, norms have legal sig- 
nificance when their substantive content is articu- 
lated and implemented through juridical processes 
that uphold the values of, inter alia, justice, equal- 
ity, fairness and transparency. In principle, a right 
insulates its holder from mere utilitarian or instru- 
mental claims or other claims based purely upon so- 
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cia1 good. Because the right is a form of insulation, 
it protects individuals and groups from majoritari- 
anism. 
None of this is to say, however, that rights are 
absolute. They are defeasible under certain circum- 
stances by other rights and sometimes even by ne- 
cessity and scarcity arguments as long as democrat- 
ically validated legal processes (which are open and 
transparent) are used to identify the reasonable lim- 
its upon the right. I underscore this point because it 
becomes important later: in any sophisticated West- 
ern philosophical tradition, rights are subject to pro- 
cesses of balancing, although there is no consensus 
upon the ideal balance to be achieved. This desire 
for balance is manifest in the principal international 
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human  Rights22 (drafted by another distinguished 
McGill colleague, Professor John Humphrey).23 
N'oublions pas que l'origine de beaucoup de ter- 
mes retenus dans les conventions internationales sur 
les droits de la personne remonte aux 6crits du dix- 
huitikme sibcle en Europe et en Amkrique, notam- 
ment & la dkclaration des droits de l'homme et la 
dkclaration d'indkpendance des ~ t a t s - ~ n i s .  On peut 
6galement remonter jusqu7B Aristote et B la Magnn 
Carta pour retracer les sources de cette tradition. 
Je tiens B souligner les origines terminologiques des 
droits de la personne par souci de clart6: I'expression 
des normes internationales est issue d'une longue 
tradition philosophique et politique ~ c c i d e n t a l e . ~ ~  
The contemporary teminology of human rights - 
even within the Western tradition - is ideologically 
loaded. For example, the eminent philospher Isaiah 
Berlin emphasized the difference between so-called 
negative and positive rights.25 Negative rights were 
said to be individual rights that inhibited state ac- 
tion: the individual had a right to be "let alone" by 
the state. On the other hand, positive rights were 
those rights that required active state intervention, 
such as the large body of economic, social and cul- 
tural rights. This characterization led some com- 
mentators and political figures to argue that only 
negative rights were real rights and that positive 
rights were nothing more than  entitlement^.^^ 
Another term often used to describe a certain cat- 
egory of rights is "fundamental rights." The diffi- 
culty is what one chooses to  include within the cat- 
egory. For most Western governments, fundamental 
rights have traditionally included only civil and po- 
litical rights, most notably the freedoms of expres- 
sion, association, assembly and religion. The use 
of the term "fundamental" can imply that there is 
a clear hierarchy of rights, with these being more 
important than the others. But as soon as one at- 
tempts to establish such a hierarchy, one discovers 
how artificial the attempt really is. For that rea- 
son, many contemporary scholars would argue that 
all human rights are important and that they are 
mutually r e i n f ~ r c i n g . ~ ~  
I want to discuss as well the approach based uon 
"generations" of rights, a term coined by Karel 
V a ~ a k . ~ ~  According to this terminology, the first 
generation of rights encompasses civil and polit,i- 
cal rights. including the "fundamental rights." the 
panoply of legal rights, democratic-participatioil 
rights, and a whole series of antidiscrimination right,s 
based on defined categories such as sex, race and 
The second generation of rights includes 
all economic, social and cultural rights, such as the 
right to food, health, education, work and social 
security.30 The implementation of these rights re- 
quires domestic and international action, and a re- 
assessment of public-spending priorities. The third 
generation of rights would include the right to de- 
velopment, which is to be found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights dating from 1948,31 as 
well as the right to a healthy environment, the right 
to peace and the right to humanitarian a s s i s t a~ l ce .~~  
Here the focus is almost entirely upon international 
cooperation as a means to implementation of the 
rights. If a state is not in a position to fully im- 
plement the right to development, for example, then 
the people of that state should be entitled to assis- 
tance from other states in order to give effect to the 
right. It will be obvious that such a right is likely 
to cause consternation in the halls of power of many 
Western democracies. The right to developnlcnt is 
very expensive to implement. 
In short, the evolution of human-rights discourse 
over the last forty years has been marked by an evcr 
increasing list of rights and various attempts at cat,- 
egorization. The effort to  define hierarchies of rights 
has been unsuccessful, but has itself fed ideological 
confrontation. 
B. Culture 
A second fundamental definitional question is 
what we mean by "cultural values," the values which 
are said to be in conflict when we discuss human 
rights in an international setting. If the notion of 
rights is a difficult concept, culture is even more 
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complex and multifaceted. Roy Preiswerk has de- 
fined culture as "a totality of values, institutions 
and forms of behaviour transmitted within a soci- 
ety ... [which] covers Weltanschauung [world view], 
ideologies and cognitive b e h a ~ i o u r . " ~ ~  A more suc- 
cinct definition is offered by Clifford Geertz, who 
characterized culture as "an historically transmitted 
pattern of meanings embodied in symbols."34 
One helpful symbol of culture is the tree.35 At 
the top of the tree, we see its ultimate flourishing: 
branches and leaves. In the leaves and branches we 
see the form of the culture, including patterns of 
behaviour, custom, language, arts and history. Just 
below we see the most impressive element of the tree: 
its trunk. In the trunk we see the structure of the 
culture, involving family arrangements, social orga- 
nization and practices in economics, politics, health 
care, education and law. Underground, of course, 
are the nourishing roots, the system that allows the 
tree to flourish. In the roots, we see the mythic 
level of culture: world view, attitudes towards time 
and space, epistemology, values and cosmology. Of 
course, the depth of the roots, the sturdiness of the 
trunk and the shape and texture of the leaves - the 
evolution of a culture - will depend upon climate 
and other environmental conditions. 
In some senses, the idea of human rights oper- 
ates at  all three levels of culture, it expresses itself 
in form, structure and myth. But what I want to 
emphasize is that the Western view of human rights 
is rooted in myth, in the generative sense of that 
word. Western versions of human rights are largely 
anthropocentric and they focus upon autonomy of 
the individual, treating people as ends in themselves. 
Of course, this mythology is then expressed in struc- 
tural legal terms, but human rights is not essentially 
a legal concept. Rather, important expressions of 
the concept have precise legal meanings when fil- 
tered through a value-laden legal system that shapes 
and constrains definition, norm identification and 
processes of implementation. 
If this approach to  culture has any utility, it high- 
lights two important difficulties. First, we must ask 
who participates in the construction of "culture"? 
Do we look solely a t  the state as the definer of cul- 
ture? To dominant elites? Or do we look as well at  
"traditional" groups within societies? From a legal 
perspective, the central issue here is one of legiti- 
macy, the legitimacy of the state government which 
seeks to  define a "national" culture. 
A second issue is whether cultures can change. 
The organic symbol of the tree suggests that cul- 
tures are dynamic, that they are influenced by other 
cultures, and that they i n t e ~ ~ e n e t r a t e . ~ ~  111 other 
words, cultures can change through both internal 
and external forces. This is true for both West,- 
ern and non-Western cultures. Canada has been 
reshaped through immigration and political attach- 
ments to multiculturalism, just as African and Asian 
cultures have been reshaped through colonialism and 
the dominance of the Western media.37 Cultural 
"purity" is a nonsense, but it seems to be a con- 
vincing nonsense for nationalists around the globe, 
and in our own backyard. 
111. Clash of Cultures? 
This brings me to the so-called "clash of cul- 
tures" and its import for contemporary human- 
rights claims. In June of 1995, the Voice of Vietnam 
broadcast excerpts from an article in the army news- 
paper entitled "Human Rights: A Precious Tree and 
a Soil to Grow It In" in which the following com- 
ments were made: "The ways in which the human 
rights offensive of the Western countries has beexi 
intensified have caused many people to worry that 
this issue could be the greatest source of ideological 
and cultural conflict in decades to come ..."38 This 
article is typical of the rhetoric that has emerged 
over the last few years concerning a supposed clash 
of cultures between ..The West" and "The East" (or 
between "The North" and "The South"). One of the 
most articulate proponents of the clash is Kishore 
Mahbubani, the permanent secretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. In a series of articles 
published in leading journals he has documented the 
collapse of the West, both in terms of its economy 
and its social structures. He has linked this collapse 
to Western decadence, which in turn he relates to 
an overemphasis upon human rights, an exaltation 
of the individual a t  the expense of society.3g 
I1 me semble que ce conflit a kt4 excessivement 
dramatis6 et manipulk politiquement dans le but de 
protCger certains ~ t a t s ,  et  surtout les Clites de ces 
~ t a t s ,  d'un examen international rigoureux. La de- 
scription m6me de ce pseudo-conflit est peu nuancke 
en ce qu'elle se base sur un portrait caricatural des 
valeurs occidentales et non-occidentales. Perniettez- 
moi de vous citer quelques exemples. 
As concerns the caricatured portrayal of West- 
ern values, it is important to note that contrary to 
the evaluations offered by some interested observers, 
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Western values are not unremittingly individualist. tion of entrepreneurship is expressly upheld as an 
Indeed, there are significant strains of Western phi- important social value, even though entrepreneurs 
losophy in which deep concern is expressed about the are classic individualists. An astute Singaporean ob- 
proper relationship between individuals and society. server has noted that liberal and universalist philo- 
I am alluding, of course, to  European and Canadian sophical strands can be found "in the vast body 
social democracy and to the profound communitar- of Asian culture and within classical Confucian 
ianism of such influential thinkers as Charles Taylor thought."44 
- 
and Alasdair ~ a c I n t ~ r e . ~ O  Furthermore, in all West- one must also be careful not to adopt a 
ern societies limitations on individual rights can be assumption that particular values are shared by 
and are justified. The European Convention for the all Asians or Africans. During the nineteel~t~h and 
Protection of Human Rights and early twentieth centuries, Western scholars of Asia 
doms contains an express limitation cause,41 as does often succumbed to 1borientalism,,3 the attempt to 
the ~anadian Charter of Rights and ~ r e e d o m ~ s , ~ ~  to draw a homogenous, and typically negative, picture 
offer but two examples. of the world to the east of Europe.45 It strikes me 
One must also be careful not to treat as exactly 
commensurate "Western values" and American con- 
stitutional law, a mistake that is often made by cul- 
tural critics of the West. In many respects, U.S. 
domestic law is not an adequate exemplar for in- 
ternational human-rights standards. In the area of 
freedom of expression, for example, the failure to 
impose significant limits within the United States 
upon violent pornography and hate propaganda is 
not mirrored in all other Western societies. Nor 
is it accurate to  view the human-rights movement 
as dominated by the United States. Civil liber- 
ties and human rights have grown in importance 
within the Latin American region since the demise 
of various dictatorships. South Africa has adopted 
a leading role in the promotion of civil and politi- 
cal rights, most recently in its advocacy of strong 
actions against the Nigerian dictatorship. The most 
forceful intrusion upon traditional notions of state 
sovereignty is found in the European C o n ~ e n t i o n , ~ ~  
not in an American text. 
Finally, when portraying Western values, it is im- 
portant not to trivialize the notion of human rights. 
It is not fair or accurate to blame Western "deca- 
dence" solely on a fetish for rights. For example, vi- 
olent pornography is not treated as a right in most 
Western societies, even though it is widely available 
in some. In any event, violent pornography is also 
produced, distributed and consumed extensively in 
the Western world. 
As concerns non-Western (usually described as 
Asian or African) values, one should note that they 
are not unremittingly communal or social in orien- 
tation. In societies as disparate as Singapore, Nige- 
ria and Malaysia, individual achievement, both aca- 
demic and financial, is widely appreciated. The no- 
that some advocat,es of Asian or African values arc 
now participating in the same counterintuitive cx- 
ercise, but seeking to put a uniformly positive gloss 
on "indigenous" cultural artifacts.46 For example, 
the use of corporal punishment in Singapore is justi- 
fied as an example of social discipline rooted in the 
Asian values of deference to authority and a desire 
for social stability and cohesion. Yet this practice is 
not matched by any similar state-sanctioned punish- 
ments in India or Japan. Indeed, it could be argued 
that corporal punishment is itself a Western impo- 
sition, a "value" inherited from the British.47 It is 
ironic to attack Western values using "Asian" exam- 
ples actually drawn from Western cultural practices. 
No culture is pristine and monolithic, and it behoves 
us all to admit the interplay of values and practices 
that has shaped and continues to  shape the overlap- 
ping cultures of the contemporary world. 
Some of the Asian or African values that are up- 
held as admirable are frankly irrelevant to a discus- 
sion of human rights. There is simply no point of 
disagreement as between the West and the East on 
the theoretical importance of the family or of hard 
work. The fact that these values may not universally 
be acted upon is not related primarily to the socially 
weakening effects of human rights, but to the frailty 
of the human will. 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, pro- 
ponents of Asian or African values often seem to 
have trouble distinguishing between social or com- 
munity values and rules that are simply imposed by 
an authoritarian nation state. It is odd that in a 
purported attempt to support indigenous Asian or 
African values, state power should be promoted, as 
the state itself is in large measure a Western imposi- 
tion. In the name of the collectivity, states can actu- 
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ally stifle the traditional community. It seems to me 
that true communitarianism implies consensus that 
should not require authoritarian state control, such 
as administrative detention, widespread censorship 
and limitations upon the emergence of civil society. 
Conclusion 
And so I return to the work of F.R. Scott for guid- 
ance. How might we move beyond the clash of cul- 
tures, to find "the fertility of love" experienced on 
Kanbawza Road? First, we require some honesty 
and humility on both "sides" of the argument. We 
need to sit on our heels and level our eyes. 
I believe that it is helpful to admit frankly that 
the language of rights is Western in its philosophi- 
cal roots. But I would then ask what underlies this 
language. It seems to me that the goal of human 
freedom and the desire to  promote physical, intel- 
lectual and spiritual development are values shared 
by Asian and African peoples and governments, as 
well as by Western peoples and governments. Fur- 
thermore, given the predominance of the interstate 
system, we are simply "stuck" with a Western lan- 
guage of human rights; it is the language that has 
inspired all the relevant international instruments. 
Bien que le langage des droits de la personne soit 
d'origine occidentale, il est possible d'6tablir cer- 
taines analogies culturelles. N'est-il pas possible 
d'envisager une terminologie indigkne, soit africaine 
ou asiatique, pour exprimer le respect des individus 
et des groupes? 
If we are to  succeed in bridging the so-called clash 
of cultures, it will also be important to  listen to di- 
verse voices within Asian, African and Western so- 
cieties. We need to put ourselves in positions where 
the plurality of perspectives can be heard. No soci- 
ety has a completely homogenous philisophical tra- 
dition. Moreover, governmental legitimacy is a rel- 
evant issue to raise in some cases. For example, 
with the categories of a n ~ t h e r . " ~ '  Human rights is 
a complex idea with differing emphases even as be- 
tween various Western societies.50 Only with appro- 
priate humility and self-doubt can true dialogue be 
encouraged. 
She moved toward me 
then drew back 
afraid 
She understood the ritual 
taught in her family 
but never dreamed a foreign giant 
might need her blessing 
Seeing her torn 
between faith and fear 
I sat down on my heels 
Burmese fashion 
levelling my eyes with her eyes 
At once her fear vanished 
she smiled at me 
her little hands 
dipped the sprig in the bowl 
and touched me with the fertility 
of love 
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